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Abstract 
This editorial introduces the special issue, and considers what the articles in it tell us about the prospects of mass 
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1. Introduction 
Can mass atrocities be prevented, and if so, how? Mass 
atrocity prevention has become a “growth area” in the 
academic literature, and in the policy world, as seen in 
an increasing number of academic articles and books 
on the topic (see, for example: Bellamy, 2011; Cush-
man, 2003; Evans, 2008; Gosldstone et al., 2010; Ham-
burg, 2010; Stamnes, 2008; Zartman, 2010), and in-
creasing attention given to mass atrocity prevention by 
UN officials, by governments, and by NGOs. Various 
task forces—most prominently the US Task Force on 
Genocide Prevention—have made recommendations 
to governments (Genocide Prevention Task Force, 
2008; Task Force on the EU Prevention of Mass Atroci-
ties, 2013; Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human 
Rights Studies, 2009), the UN Office of the Special Ad-
viser on the Prevention of Genocide has made pro-
posals to strengthen mass atrocity prevention (UN, 
2014), and NGOs such as The Stanley Foundation and 
the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect have 
large and well-respected prevention programmes. The 
US Holocaust Memorial Museum recently launched the 
“Early Warning Project”, to provide analysis of the risks 
of mass atrocities occurring around the world. 
Reflecting this context, the call for papers for this 
special issue generated a large response, such that the 
accepted articles will actually fill two volumes. The 
special issue contains articles that analyse and contrib-
ute to the state of knowledge regarding factors that 
could lead to the perpetration of mass atrocities, and 
that critically assess responses to potential or ongoing 
situations of mass atrocities. The articles should 
prompt further debate in the academic literature, and 
among policy entrepreneurs and policy-makers.  
2. Special Issue: Part 1 
The first part of the special issue contains papers that 
consider and assess the factors that lead to mass atroc-
ities, which could thus form part of strategy to prevent 
atrocities. A key overall lesson that emerges in this part 
is that knowledge of the context and conditions in par-
ticular cases of possible mass atrocity situations is cru-
cial: policy toolkits and frameworks can provide a start-
ing point in any mass atrocity prevention strategy, but 
without knowledge and intelligence of the local and re-
gional dynamics, prevention strategies are unlikely to 
be effective. 
In “Triggers of Mass Atrocities”, Scott Straus anal-
yses the utility of the concept of “triggers” in under-
standing and preventing mass atrocities. He finds that 
in some cases there are indeed “turning points” after 
which violence sharply escalates. But he still urges cau-
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tion because the same sort of trigger may lead to dif-
ferent outcomes, and there are factors other than the 
trigger itself that matter if mass atrocities are perpe-
trated. Knowledge of specific cases could still, howev-
er, enable observers to try to predict whether certain 
triggers could lead to an escalation of violence. 
Cecilia Jacob’s “Evaluating the United Nation’s 
Agenda for Atrocity Prevention” critiques the UN’s 
framework for analysing atrocity crimes (UN, 2014). 
Using Pakistan as a case study, she shows that the 
framework would be more effective if it took into ac-
count the relational dynamics of atrocity crimes, and 
the links between the micro and macro dynamics of 
political violence in specific situations. 
In “Understanding Mass Atrocity Prevention during 
Periods of Democratic Transition”, Stephen McLoughlin 
compares the transitions in the early 1990s in Burundi 
and Guyana, and considers why processes of democra-
tisation broke down into mass atrocities in the first 
case but not in the second. The explanation centres on 
the regional context and history of past atrocities, the 
quality of domestic political competition, and the state 
of the armed forces in each country. The analysis yields 
insights for prevention, pointing to the principal actors 
responsible for avoiding risk escalation, and the factors 
that can inhibit violence during times of heightened 
tension. 
Collette Mazzuccelli and Dylan Hendon’s “Unearth-
ing Truth: Forensic Anthropology, Translocal Memory, 
and ‘Provention’ in Guatemala” also focuses on the 
“local”, in particular how families can contribute to 
mass atrocity prevention by pressing for transitional 
justice. They argue for “drilling down” to the structural 
roots of conflict so as to better understand how the 
risks of atrocities can be overcome. 
In “Stopping Mass Atrocities: Targeting the Dicta-
tor”, Maartje Weerdesteijn argues that atrocities are 
often perpetrated in authoritarian regimes where 
crimes are legitimised through ideology. She compares 
the extent to which Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic 
were truly motivated by ideology or were using it in-
strumentally. She argues that leaders that are ideologi-
cal are less responsive to international pressure and ac-
tion than leaders that are non-ideological. 
Ideology is also the focus of “Preventing Mass 
Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions”, by 
Jonathan Leader Maynard. He argues that as ideology 
plays a role in the perpetration of mass atrocities, ideo-
logies should also be studied from the perspective of 
mass atrocity prevention. Ideological strategies and in-
terventions—such as peace broadcasting, peace educa-
tion, or jamming anti-civilian media messages— should 
be used as part of broader prevention strategies.  
A more critical view of the potential of prevention is 
provided in “The Viability of the ‘Responsibility to Pre-
vent’”. Aidan Hehir casts doubt on the efficacy of pre-
vention because the vast array of factors that might 
lead to mass atrocities makes early warning difficult, 
there is no clear causal link between various danger 
signs and the actual occurrence of mass atrocities, and 
the response of the “international community” to po-
tential mass atrocities depends on the political will of 
states, which is also variable. Prevention is not impos-
sible, but depends entirely on the “whims of particular 
states” and their “often nefarious political interests”. 
The final article in the first part of the special issue 
is a commentary by Bridget Moix, which examines the 
progress in protecting civilians from mass violence 
since the Responsibility to Protect appeared in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document. She argues 
that in future there should be a greater focus on “up-
stream” prevention (that is, prevention well before vio-
lence is under way), and on strengthening local capaci-
ties to minimise the risks of atrocities and mass violence.  
3. Special Issue: Part 2 
The second part of the special issue critically assesses 
the response of a variety of actors to mass atrocities. 
The articles tend to consider the failures and limits of 
responses by states, international organisations, and 
regional organisations to situations of mass atrocities, 
though some authors point to progress made in terms 
of accepting the responsibility to protect populations 
from mass atrocities. Many, but not all, of the articles 
in this part focus on the cases of Libya and Syria, two of 
the most recent and high-profile cases in which large 
numbers of people have been killed amid much criti-
cism of outsiders’ response.  
The response of a variety of states to mass atroci-
ties by Indonesia in East Timor in the late 1970s is the 
focus of Clinton Fernandes’ article, “Accomplice to 
Mass Atrocities”. He argues that Australia, the US, New 
Zealand and Canada did not “look away” but rather 
that they were aware of the humanitarian crisis and 
nonetheless provided military and diplomatic aid to In-
donesia, which was largely responsible for the crisis. In-
telligence and early warning, in other words, may not 
lead states to try to stop atrocities.  
States have since declared that they have a respon-
sibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes. 
One key question is what would drive states to fulfil 
this responsibility? In “Genocide Prevention and West-
ern National Security: The Limitations of Making R2P 
All About Us”, Maureen S. Hiebert analyses two well-
known policy reports (Genocide Prevention Task Force 
2008 and Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human 
Rights Centres 2009) that recommend atrocity preven-
tion. She argues that both reports make the case for 
prevention on national security grounds, but the prob-
lem is that it is difficult to prove that national security 
interests are in fact implicated in particular cases of 
mass atrocities. Instead, western states might be moti-
vated to prevent and respond to atrocities if it can be 
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shown that doing so is linked to safeguarding their 
reputations as responsible members of the interna-
tional community. 
Matthew Levinger’s article, “A Core National Securi-
ty Interest: Framing Atrocities Prevention”, illustrates 
how problematic the link is between mass atrocity pre-
vention and national security interests. He analyses US 
President Barack Obama’s communication strategies 
regarding threats of mass atrocities in Libya, Syria and 
Iraq, and shows that hardly ever did Obama’s speeches 
make a link to threats to US national security.  
The next two articles examine the policies and ac-
tions of two regional organisations, the European Un-
ion and NATO. “Is a European Practice of Mass Atrocity 
Prevention Emerging? The European Union, Responsi-
bility to Protect and the 2011 Libya Crisis?”, by Chiara 
De Franco and Annemarie Peen Rodt, analyses the Eu-
ropean Union’s practices during and after the 2011 Lib-
ya crisis. They argue that the crisis prompted the EU to 
incorporate—to a greater extent than ever before—its 
own interpretation of the responsibility to protect into 
its security culture and policy-making structures, large-
ly by integrating it into its “comprehensive approach” 
to security and development. 
NATO’s actions in the 2011 Libya crisis are excoriat-
ed by Jeffrey Bachman in “R2P’s ‘Ulterior Motive Ex-
emption’ and the Failure to Protect in Libya”. Bach-
man’s critique of the NATO intervention centres on its 
ulterior motive for intervention—the overthrow of 
Qaddafi—which meant that it not only exceeded the 
UN Security Council’s R2P mandate, but supported re-
bels who were committing human rights abuses and 
failed to protect civilians after Qaddafi was executed. 
Bachman’s article again illustrates the dangers and di-
lemmas posed by linking national interests (in regime 
change) with the will to intervene to protect popula-
tions from mass atrocities.  
The criticism of international responses to mass 
atrocities continues in the commentary, “Is R2P a Fully-
Fledged International Norm?”, by Jason Ralph and James 
Souter. They argue that outside actors have done more 
than just fail to respond to the atrocities inside Syria: 
they have failed to protect the refugees that have fled 
the atrocities, and have thus failed to fulfil their respon-
sibilities to protect populations, just as they failed to 
help rebuild Libya after the 2011 crisis. Their argument 
is even more forceful considering the unprecedented 
refugee ‘crisis’ now facing Europe and the disturbing 
disarray it has provoked among governments.  
Policy-makers clearly struggle with unpalatable di-
lemmas when mass atrocities are being perpetrated, as 
the range of possible and effective response narrows 
with escalations of violence. In “Perpetrators, Presi-
dents, and Profiteers: Teaching Genocide Prevention 
and Response through Classroom Simulation”, Wait-
man Wade Beorn shows how such dilemmas can be in-
vestigated in the classroom, through a simulation 
called GENPREVEX. Simulations have the potential to 
teach students about the complexities faced by deci-
sion-makers, and to be more aware of the world 
around them.  
4. Conclusion 
So is mass atrocity prevention an elusive or a realisable 
goal? Several of the articles in this special issue illus-
trate the challenges and limits of prevention policies 
and strategies, and cast particular doubt on the will-
ingness and ability of various members of the “interna-
tional community” to respond to possible and ongoing 
mass atrocities in a way that leads to their containment 
or termination. But this special issue also highlights 
several factors that, if incorporated into mass atrocity 
prevention strategies, could ultimately lead to fewer 
atrocities occurring worldwide. These could lead to 
more effective and legitimate “upstream” strategies 
that are based on expert knowledge of particular con-
texts and in conjunction with local actors. 
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